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Spotlight on Safety at Nuclear Power Plants: 
 The View from Oyster Creek 
 
RICHARD WEBSTER* WITH JULIA LEMENSE** 
I.  ABSTRACT 
This article shows that the ongoing litigation over the relicensing of 
the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant (“Oyster Creek”) and a few other 
nuclear power plants continues to put a spotlight on the regulation of safety 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”).  The glare of the 
spotlight has already revealed that the NRC Staff has largely lost touch with 
the basic purpose of the agency, which is solely to regulate safety, not to 
promote nuclear power.1  Instead, at Oyster Creek (and some other nuclear 
plants), the Staff has appeared more concerned about dismissing any 
concerns raised by their safety reviews rather than enforcing the safety 
requirements, which are themselves often unclear or ambiguous.  This 
misguided agenda has been evident in decisions about both ongoing safety 
and relicensing. Happily, even though the litigation procedures are 
inadequate, when certain decisions have been vigorously litigated, some 
relief has been forthcoming from administrative adjudicatory bodies such as 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (“ASLB”) and the Commission 
itself.  However, the current procedures are extremely hostile to effective 
 
 * Mr. Webster is the legal director of the Eastern Environmental Law Center and 
represented six citizens’ groups that opposed the relicensing of the Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Power Plant, the oldest in the nation. In addition to a law degree from Columbia Law 
School, Mr. Webster has a degree in physics from Oxford University, a Masters degree in 
engineering hydrology from Imperial College of Science and Technology, and long 
experience as a scientific consultant for industry, governments, multilateral entities, and 
environmental groups. The views expressed in this paper are his own, not those of his clients 
or his employer. 
 **  Ms. Julia LeMense, Executive Director, Eastern Environmental Law Center, played 
an invaluable role in the development of this article by working with the author to litigate the 
Oyster Creek case, co-authoring briefs containing many of the concepts that went into this 
article, and refining the expression of those concepts. The author would also like to 
acknowledge the role of the many others who have helped develop the concepts expressed in 
this article through discussions and collaborations with the author, including Paul Gunter, 
David Lochbaum, Dianne Curran, Philip Musegaas, Anthony Roisman, John Sipos, Jon 
Block, and Janice Dean. 
 1. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, History, http://www.nrc.gov/about- 
nrc/history.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
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intervention by public-interest groups and many decisions, such as 
relicensing, can be taken without a hearing or Commission action in the 
absence of intervention.  Therefore, many decisions taken by the NRC Staff 
go into effect without any searching internal or external review.  This lack 
of effective review reduces the quality of these decisions.  Thus, without 
serious reform of both the safety culture of the staff and the internal and 
external review procedures, the ability of the NRC to carry out its mandate 
to ensure that nuclear power plants within the United States are operated 
safely is seriously in doubt.  One element of reform should be to ensure that 
before major decisions, like relicensing, are taken there is an effective 
internal review of NRC Staff actions by the ASLB and then the 
Commission.  However, experience has shown that even the Commission is 
subject to strong pressure from the regulated community.  Robust external 
review of NRC decisions is therefore critical if the agency is to avoid 
recapture by the industry.  The best approach to providing such a review is 
to actively encourage citizen involvement in the decision-making processes 
of the NRC through greater transparency, opportunities for funding, and the 
use of fairer procedures. 
II.  STRUCTURE 
The first issue considered by this article is why the litigation about the 
relicensing of Oyster Creek shed new light on the NRC’s regulation of 
safety when, at the time the litigation commenced, over forty nuclear power 
plants had already been relicensed and Oyster Creek itself had been 
operating for over thirty-six years.  There are at least three reasons for this.  
First, the ability of the public to challenge the ongoing safety of a nuclear 
power plant is very limited because the designated procedure lacks 
discovery rights, has seldom resulted in effective relief for public-interest 
groups, if ever, and is not generally subject to judicial review.  The lack of 
discovery rights is a major impediment to full review because during 
operation many safety-related documents are unavailable to the public.  
Second, at the behest of the nuclear industry during the 1990s, the NRC 
systematically narrowed the scope of the safety issues that could be raised 
during a relicensing proceeding to exclude most of the issues that were of 
most concern to many members of the public living close to nuclear plants, 
such as evacuation.  Finally, in 2004, the NRC changed its adjudicatory 
rules reducing discovery rights and curtailing the right to cross-
examination.  The net effect is that prior to the litigation involving Oyster 
Creek, public interest groups in relicensing proceedings had their claims 
dismissed at a very early stage, prior to any discovery, and the NRC 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/3
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approved every relicensing application it received within the twenty-two to 
thirty month guideline it had set for itself.2  Therefore, the Oyster Creek 
proceeding was the first relicensing proceeding to probe deeply into how 
the NRC was regulating a specific safety issue with the benefit of 
substantial disclosure of documents from the licensee.  It is also the first 
relicensing proceeding that went beyond the guideline time-period, 
although the Commission eventually granted the renewed license on April 
1, 2009, a few days before the original license was due to expire. 
Next, this article uses publicly available information from various 
sources, including the Oyster Creek proceedings and related reviews, to 
conclude that the NRC, as an agency, is not doing an effective job in 
managing the safety risks at nuclear power plants.  More specifically, the 
ongoing reviews of safety have been shown to be inadequate in certain 
areas and, at best, questionable in others.  Critically, the Oyster Creek 
proceedings showed that these reviews are hampered by a lack of 
understanding of the regulatory requirements at each plant.  In addition, the 
safety reviews during relicensing are very limited in scope and, even within 
that scope, have missed important issues.  It is now clear that the safety 
margins at Oyster Creek are much narrower than when the plant opened in 
1969, if indeed there is any margin of safety at all.  In addition, the State of 
New Jersey has alleged that the NRC has failed to adequately assess the risk 
of terrorism, which was not considered at all during initial licensing or 
during relicensing.  Finally, the NRC has also declared that it did not intend 
to increase the standards for safety during relicensing.  Because safety 
margins have reduced over time due to aging and new threats, Oyster Creek 
is now clearly less safe than it was forty years ago.  At the same time the 
NRC has allowed safety margins to reduce at old nuclear plants, it has 
increased the safety requirements for new plants.  This inconsistency in 
approach has created an increasing gap between the safety-requirements for 
a new plant and those for a relicensed plant.  It is, therefore, hardly 
surprising that the trend is toward relicensing of old plants rather than 
replacement with new plants. 
Finally, this article describes potential solutions to the problems that 
have been identified.  Although the relicensing proceedings for Oyster 
Creek and other reactors highlighted these problems, most of the identified 
failures relate to regulation of ongoing safety.  As the NRC itself has 
repeatedly argued, if regulation of ongoing safety were fully effective, there 
would be little safety analysis to be done during a relicensing proceeding.  
 
 2. 10 C.F.R. § 2.332(b) (2005); 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, app. B (2009). 
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Thus, without diminishing the importance of a comprehensive review of 
safety issues associated with relicensing and the need to update safety 
standards prior to relicensing, this author believes that reform should also 
be targeted at ensuring the adequate regulation of ongoing safety.  Such 
reforms should include full transparency, technical assistance to public-
interest groups, and a “citizen suit” provision that would allow such groups 
the right to raise issues concerning nuclear safety with the district court.  
Similarly, the relicensing rules should be amended to make the safety 
review conducted prior to relicensing comprehensive, to make intervention 
in the relicensing proceeding more accessible to citizens, and to provide a 
mandatory hearing on issues where there is no citizen challenge. 
A.  Statutory And Regulatory Requirements of The Atomic Energy Act 
Regarding Safety 
The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) of 1954, limits the original license 
of commercial nuclear power plants to forty years.3  Section 103 of the 
AEA, 42 U.S.C. § 2133, grants the Commission authority to issue licenses 
for the commercial exploitation of special nuclear material.  It states that 
such licenses “may be renewed upon the expiration of” the initial licensed 
period.4  However, the Commission is required to find that the authorized 
utilization of special nuclear material is “in accord with the common 
defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and 
safety of the public.”5  The “not inimical” standard also governs license 
renewal of operating nuclear reactors.6  Finally, the AEA provides that in 
any licensing proceeding, the Commission shall grant a hearing at the 
request of any potentially affected party.7 
B.  Petitions About Ongoing Safety 
In theory, citizens may request enforcement of the NRC’s safety-
requirements through a petition described by 10 C.F.R. § 2.206.  However, 
 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2009). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(c) (2009). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (2009) (“no license may be 
issued to any person within the United States if . . . in the opinion of the Commission, the 
issuance of a license to such a person would be inimical to the common defense and security 
or to the health and safety of the public”). 
 6. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943, 
64,961 (Dec. 13, 1991) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 50, 54, 140). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (2009). 
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this process suffers from at least two key problems.  First, even though such 
a petition must “specify the action requested and set forth the facts that 
constitute the basis for the request” there is no provision for discovery.8  
Thus, the petitioner must glean all the information required from public 
sources.  This is a very difficult task because even the basic safety 
requirements that each plant must meet, called the “Current Licensing 
Basis” (“CLB”), are not compiled.9  In fact, experience at Oyster Creek 
showed that even the NRC Staff got the CLB wrong throughout the hearing 
process on the safety of the containment system.10  Finally, many of the 
underlying documents on specific safety issues are unobtainable because 
the NRC Staff either does not retain them, or reviews them at the licensee’s 
site.11  Thus, a lack of transparency is one critical hindrance to citizens 
participating effectively in the ongoing oversight of nuclear plants. 
Second, citizens groups have become disillusioned with the § 2.206 
process because the NRC Staff effectively reviews its own work and the 
rights of appeal are very limited.  It is hardly surprising that the Staff 
normally finds that its own actions are sufficient and justified.  
Furthermore, petitioners do not have a right to appeal an adverse decision to 
the Commission.12  Finally, at least the Second Circuit has found that a 
refusal to take enforcement action pursuant to a § 2.206 petition is not 
judicially reviewable under the doctrine articulated in Heckler v. Chaney.13  
However, other courts have found that there is an exception to this 
presumption of unreviewablity, where the § 2.206 petition relates to 
licensing.14  At a minimum, petitioners’ rights to judicial review are in 
 
 8. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (2009). 
 9. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating 
Station Units 2 and 3), Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Petitions to Intervene and 
Requests for Hearing), LBP-08-13, 18-19 (Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50 286-LR, July 31, 
2008) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML082130436. 
 10. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co., LLC (License Renewal for Oyster Creek 
Nuclear Generating Station), Initial Decision (Rejecting Citizens’ Challenge to AmerGen’s 
Application to Renew its Operating License for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station) LBP-07-17, 19-20, n. 20 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Dec. 18, 2007) available at 
ADAMS Accession No. ML073520402. 
 11. NRC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, Audit of NRC’s License Renewal 
Program, OIG-07-A-15, 14-15 (Sept. 6, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML072490486. 
 12. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) (2009); 10 C.F.R. §2.206(c) (2009). 
 13. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
 14. Nuclear Info. Res. Service v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 969 F.2d 1169, 1178 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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doubt and petitions for enforcement of NRC regulations during operation 
are unlikely to be reviewable. 
C.  Development of the Relicensing Rules 
To implement the AEA requirements, the Commission has 
promulgated regulations that lay out the specific requirements for 
relicensing.  In the early 1980s, the NRC first started to address the 
standards for license renewal.  As a result of that effort, the agency decided 
in 1991, that “age related degradation will be critical to safety during the 
term of [a] renewed license.”  Accordingly, the Commission established a 
requirement for a plant-wide review of age-related degradation.15  The 
regulations also required licensees to demonstrate that they had effective 
programs for management of aging equipment.16  At that time, the NRC 
excluded other issues, such as emergency planning or updating the CLB, 
because the NRC believed they were adequately addressed by other existing 
regulations.17 
In 1995, the Commission further narrowed the scope of the plant-wide 
review.  It decided that with the possible exception of age-related 
degradation of long-lived passive components, the safety-related effects of 
aging are adequately managed by the ongoing regulatory scheme.18  Thus, 
the Commission narrowed the scope of the safety review upon relicensing 
to cover only age-related degradation of long-lived passive components.19  
In narrowing the scope of the equipment covered by the rule, however, the 
NRC did not alter the fundamental principles underlying the 1991, 
rulemaking, including that: (a) age-related degradation poses a threat to the 
continued safe operation of nuclear power plants, and (b) safety must be 
maintained throughout the license renewal period by managing the effects 
of aging: 
The objective of a license renewal review is to determine whether 
the detrimental effects of aging, which could adversely affect the 
functionality of systems, structures, and components that the 
Commission determines require review for the period of extended 
 
 15. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943, 64,960 (Dec. 13, 
1991). 
 16. Id. at 64,955. 
 17. Id. at 64,959. 
 18. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg 22,461, 22,464 
(May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54). 
 19. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/3
WEBSTER 7/25/2009  10:30 PM 
2009] SPOTLIGHT ON SAFETY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 371 
operation, are adequately managed.  The license renewal review is 
intended to identify any additional actions that will be needed to 
maintain the functionality of the systems, structures, and 
components in the period of extended operation.20 
Thus, in two steps, the Commission excluded many safety issues from the 
relicensing process.  Ostensibly, the intent behind the 1995 amendments 
was to base license renewal on a “predictable and stable regulatory process” 
that permits licensees “to make decisions about license renewal without 
being influenced by a regulatory process that is perceived to be uncertain, 
unstable, or not clearly defined.”21  These two rulemakings actually made 
the process more predictable by excluding from the relicensing safety 
reviews many of the issues that were of most concern to citizens living 
close to nuclear plants, such as evacuation and the risk of terrorism.22 
The NRC claims that a broader review at the license renewal stage is 
redundant because the ongoing regulatory schemes, particularly the CLB, 
the maintenance rule, and corrective actions, provide sufficient protection 
against safety and health hazards.23  Each plant’s CLB is required to be 
maintained during the renewal term in the same manner and to the same 
extent as during the original licensing term.  The maintenance rule requires 
that nuclear power reactor licensees monitor equipment against licensee-
established goals to “provide reasonable assurance” of its functionality.24  
The regulations call for immediate corrective actions when “conditions 
adverse to quality” such as “failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, 
defective material and equipment, and nonconformance” are detected.25  
Thus, in theory, there should be few issues to deal with at license renewal. 
Even the requirement of reviewing the aging of passive, long-lived, 
safety related equipment is subject to exceptions.  When the renewal 
applicant can “demonstrate that their facility has specific programs or 
processes in place to detect ongoing degradation” the NRC permits some 
covered structures and components to be “generically excluded from further 
 
 20. Id. at 22,464. 
 21. Id. at 22,462. 
 22. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), 
CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3, 6, 21-22 (2001). 
 23. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg 22,461, 22,464, 
22,466 (May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54). 
 24. Id. at 22,470. 
 25. 10 C.F.R § 50, app. B, (2009). 
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aging management review” at license renewal.26  In fact, the nuclear 
industry has requested that the NRC narrow the license renewal rule even 
further, which the NRC has promised to do once it “gains more experience 
with the effect of aging during the period of extended operation.”27 
Thus, in 1991 and 1995, the NRC effectively determined that, apart 
from the possible exception of age-related degradation of long-lived passive 
components during the license extension period, there are no major gaps in 
the current regulations that ensure safe operation of nuclear power plants or 
in their implementation.  Unfortunately, this conclusion was not based upon 
rigorous analysis of the ongoing processes, but rather upon the mere 
existence of those processes.28  In fact, much empirical and anecdotal 
evidence, presented below, suggests that the ongoing regulations are much 
less effective than the NRC assumed when it adopted the relicensing rules. 
D.  Regulatory Requirements for Relicensing 
A renewed license may only be issued if the Commission finds that 
there is reasonable assurance of future compliance with the CLB.29  In an 
operating license proceeding, the licensee generally bears the ultimate 
burden of proof.30  The Commission confirmed in Florida Power & Light 
Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), 54 NRC 3, 10 
(2001), that because corrosion and other effects become more severe over 
the extended license period, an applicant for license renewal must 
demonstrate that its programs are adequate to manage the effects of aging, 
including sufficient inspections and testing: 
Part 54 requires renewal applicants to demonstrate how their 
programs will be effective in managing the effects of aging during 
the proposed period of extended operation. . . . Applicants must 
identify any additional actions, i.e., maintenance, replacement of 
parts, etc., that will need to be taken to manage adequately the 
detrimental effects of aging. Adverse aging effects generally are 
 
 26. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,486 
(May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54). 
 27. Id. at 22,487. 
 28. NRC, Foundation for the Adequacy of the Licensing Bases, A Supplement to the 
Statement of Considerations for the Rule on Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal (10 
C.F.R. part 54), Final Report, NUREG-1412 (Dec. 31, 1991) available at ADAMS 
Accession No. ML080310668. 
 29. 10 C.F.R. § 54.29 (2009). 
 30. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 
N.R.C. 1265, 1271 (1982). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/3
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gradual and thus can be detected by programs that ensure sufficient 
inspections and testing.31 
The critical issue is the meaning of the phrase reasonable assurance.  Where 
there is a high degree of certainty that a facility complies with the CLB 
requirements, the exact meaning of “reasonable assurance” does not come 
into play.32  Thus, how the reasonable assurance standard is applied 
depends on context.  Historically, the reasonable assurance standard 
involved use of a “reasonably conservative range of values of input 
parameters.”33  However, in the recent decision largely denying the appeal 
of the Oyster Creek licensing board initial decision, the Commission found 
that the licensee could establish reasonable assurance by showing 
compliance with applicable regulations by a preponderance of the 
evidence.34  Perhaps mitigating this statement, in the same decision, the 
Commission directed the Staff to enhance their supervision of modeling 
studies that involved sensitivity analyses, which use a range of inputs to 
take account of uncertainty.35  Thus, the best view is probably that an 
applicant must show that when it uses a reasonably conservative range of 
input parameters it can meet the CLB throughout any extended period of 
operation, but licensees may now use the Oyster Creek licensing decision to 
argue that such an approach is unnecessarily conservative. 
III.  THE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ONGOING PROCESSES MADE 
DURING THE RELICENSING RULEMAKINGS ARE 
UNSUPPORTED 
A.  Empirical Evidence 
There are many examples of NRC failures to either recognize safety 
problems or resolve them, but a few dramatic recent events serve to 
illustrate that the NRC’s current approach to safety has serious flaws.  
 
 31. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), 
CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3, 7, 10 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 32. E.g., North Anna Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.2d 655, 
667-68 (1976). 
 33. In the Matter of Atlas Corp., DD-99-02, (Jan. 20, 1999). 
 34. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Company (License Renewal for Oyster Creek 
Nuclear Generating Station), Memorandum and Order, CLI-09-07 (Apr. 1, 2009), slip op. at 
35. 
 35. Id. at 67-68. 
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Incredibly, the NRC failed to recognize that the increased threat of 
terrorism since September 2001 had legal and factual implications for 
ongoing safety and license renewal that required close analysis.  Legally, 
the NRC failed to recognize that because terrorist attacks on nuclear plants 
became foreseeable, their potential consequences had to be included in the 
environmental analysis carried out pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“NEPA”), prior to licensing or relicensing.36  
Even after the Ninth Circuit decided this issue, the NRC refused to apply 
this requirement to relicensing outside that Circuit.37  Factually, in 2005, a 
National Academy of Sciences Report for Congress showed that the NRC 
had failed to adequately assess the huge risk of storing spent fuel in 
elevated pools that are vulnerable to terrorist attack.  The consequences of a 
spent fuel pool fire would be enormous.  For example, estimates show that 
one fuel pool fire could cause 24,000 lung cancers and economic damage 
that could be ten times that caused by Hurricane Katrina.38  Even though it 
is privy to safeguard information that the NRC claims has resolved this 
issue, the State of New Jersey has stated that the spent fuel pool at the 
Oyster Creek plant is a “major security concern”39 and litigated its ability to 
raise this issue in relicensing in the Third Circuit. 
In 2002, severe corrosion on the top of the reactor pressure vessel 
caused the Davis-Besse reactor near Cleveland to come within months of a 
 
 36. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 37. The State of New Jersey claimed that the NRC should study the potential impact of 
terrorism as part of the relicensing process for Oyster Creek. However, the Commission 
ultimately rejected the impact as beyond the scope of the relicensing process. In the Matter 
of AmerGen Energy Company (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station), Memorandum and Order, CLI-07-08, 1-2 (Feb. 26, 2007) available at ADAMS 
Accession No. ML070570511. The Commission further stated that “nothwithstanding a 
recent decision by United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit… we reiterate our 
longstanding view that NEPA demands no terrorism inquiry.”  Id. The Commission admitted 
that while San Luis Obispo would require study of the impact of terrorist attacks prior to 
relicensing, the Commission decided that it “disagree[d] with the Ninth Circuit’s view.” Id. 
at 5. The Commission therefore decided to adhere to the San Luis Obispo decision only in 
the Ninth Circuit by holding that terrorism is “beyond the scope” of relicensing in other 
Circuits. Id. (citing In the Matter of Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 
& 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), 56 N.R.C. 358, 364 (2002)). New Jersey’s 
appeal of this decision was recently denied by the Third Circuit in part on the basis that the 
impact from a potential terrorist attack is not caused by the federal action in question. New 
Jersey Dept. of Env’tl Protection v. NRC, 591 F.3d 132_(3rd Cir. 2009). 
 38. Letter from Richard Webster, Staff Attorney, Rutgers Envtl. Law Clinic, to Chief, 
Rules Review and Directives Branch U.S. N.R.C. 2, 12-15 (Sept. 8, 2006) available at 
ADAMS Accession No. ML062610359. 
 39. Letter from Lipoti, Director of N.J. Division of Environmental Safety and Health, to 
Richard Webster (Jan. 2, 2008). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/3
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melt down.  The NRC Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) concluded 
that by allowing the plant to operate beyond a deadline for fixing the 
problem, the agency had placed the economic interests of the plant owner 
above the safety of the public.  In addition, the OIG found that the NRC had 
“informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute 
proof of a safety problem” instead of acting when the licensee can no longer 
affirmatively show that safety is reasonably assured.40  A 2002 survey 
showed that 47% of the NRC’s employees are afraid to speak out about 
safety issues because they fear doing so would jeopardize their jobs, and 
that employees were concerned that pressure from the industry is greatly 
undermining the agency’s ability to oversee safety.  In 2003, the Witt 
Report regarding the evacuation plan for the Indian Point Nuclear Power 
Plant highlighted many flaws in that plan.41 
In August of 2007, a cooling tower cell at the Vermont Yankee plant 
completely collapsed.  In October of the same year, a video showing 
sleeping guards at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant aired on national 
television.  In addition, through participation in the Oyster Creek 
proceeding, the intervenors discovered that the thickness measurements that 
the NRC and the licensee had relied upon to show safety for ten years were 
systematically wrong; the containment was thinner than those results 
showed and possibly below the CLB requirement.42 
More recently the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has 
highlighted the need for better NRC oversight of fire safety.43  Despite the 
discoveries in the early 1980s of an issue with short circuits and in the late 
1980s that certain fire retardant materials failed to meet the specified level 
of protection, the NRC is still struggling to devise a satisfactory approach to 
fire protection.44  The NRC has also failed to track what measures are 
 
 40. NRC Office of the Inspector General Event Inquiry: NRC’s Regulation of Davis-
Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No. 02-03S), 23 (Dec. 30, 
2002). 
 41. James Lee Witt and Associates, LLC, Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas 
Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone (Mar. 7, 2003) available at http://www.wittassociates 
.com/1296.xml. 
 42. See, e.g., NRC, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal 
Application of Oyster Creek Generating Station, Excerpts, NUREG-1875, 3-127 (Apr. 30, 
2007) (finding definite bias in the 1996 readings) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML072851132. 
 43. GAO, NRC’s Oversight of Fire Protection at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Units Could 
Be Strengthened, GAO- 08-747 (June 2008) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML081840045. 
 44. Id. at 18-23. 
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actually in place to protect from fires; instead it relies on licensee 
documents that are not available to citizens.45 
Finally, during the preparation of this article, Vermont Yankee had yet 
more problems with leakage from the cooling towers and an inspection at 
Oyster Creek showed that corrosion of the containment was ongoing 
despite the many assurances that had been provided by witnesses for the 
NRC Staff and the reactor operator.46  In his dissenting opinion regarding 
the Oyster Creek relicensing, Commissioner Jaczko noted that “the expert 
testimony the Board found persuasive was optimistic, at best.”47 
B.  Evidence From NRC Adjudications 
As discussed above, few NRC Staff decisions are scrutinized by the 
adjudicatory arm of the NRC, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
(“ASLB”).  Yet, in the proceedings that have occurred, some judges within 
the ASLB have been critical of how the NRC Staff has been approaching 
safety issues.  For example, one judge recently raised questions about the 
safety culture of the NRC Staff, stating that the approach taken to two 
issues “may be symptomatic of safety culture deficiencies, and thus raise a 
serious question about a foundation of nuclear safety – the culture of the 
government organization responsible for promoting it.”48  Although Judge 
Farrar stated that an alternative explanation could be that the NRC Staff 
behavior in that proceeding was “aberrational,” other proceedings confirm 
that it was not.49  For example, as mentioned above, in the relicensing 
proceeding regarding the Oyster Creek power plant in New Jersey, the Staff 
announced that that the safety of the containment vessel should not be 
judged by whether it meets the engineering code. 
In another recent case, the ASLB found that the NRC Staff had 
exhibited a “more than casual attitude” regarding the safety of the public 
 
 45. Id. at 23-24. 
 46. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), 
Motion by Counsel to Reopen the Record and to Postpone Final Disposition of the 
Relicensing Decision, 3-7, 14-15 (Docket No 50-219-LR, Feb. 2, 2009) available at 
ADAMS Accession No. ML090480395. 
 47. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), 
Memorandum and Order, CLI- 09-07 (Docket No. 50-219-LR, Apr. 1, 2009) (partial dissent 
of Commissioner Jaczko at 7) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML 090930344. 
 48. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Servs. (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), 
Licensing Board Memorandum and Order, LBP-08-11 at 46 (Docket No.70-3098-MLA, Jun. 
27, 2008) (concurring opinion of Judge Farrar) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML081790253. 
 49. Id. 
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living close to a site where piles of radioactive wastes had been left 
uncovered for ten years after the plant stopped handling radioactive 
materials.50  The Board found that residents who might be affected by 
groundwater contamination were entitled to greater consideration. 
In mandatory hearings on Early Site Permit (“ESP”) applications, the 
ASLB is obliged to review the Staff’s performance with respect to 
uncontested issues.51  In several recent ESP cases, the ASLB has found 
significant deficiencies in the quality of the NRC Staff’s reviews, thereby 
supporting the need for greater Commission supervision of the NRC Staff. 
In the Clinton ESP proceeding, for example, the ASLB found “many 
instances” in which “the technical portions of the Staff documents in the 
record (particularly the SER and to some degree, the EIS) did not support a 
finding that the Staff’s review supported its decisions.”52  In these 
instances, the ASLB was unable to make judgments about the adequacy of 
the ESP application because “the record as initially presented to us often 
did not supply adequate technical information or flow of logic to permit a 
judgment as to whether the Staff had a reasonable basis for its 
conclusions.”53  Furthermore, the ASLB was forced to make many inquiries 
due to “the lack of explanation and lack of clarity found in a large portion 
of the [final] SER.”54  The ASLB further found that the draft SER 
contained “a plethora of instances where the Staff’s conclusions could only 
be characterized as conclusory.”55  The final SER, although an 
improvement, “still failed in a large number of instances to logically 
connect facts to conclusions.”56 
In addition to the concerns about the lack of clear logic, the ASLB was 
also concerned that the NRC Staff had not verified the facts asserted by the 
applicant.57  The Board found that, for the relatively simple matters at issue 
in an early site permit proceeding, this was acceptable, but for construction 
 
 50. In the Matter of Shieldalloy Metallurgical Group Corp., Memorandum (Licensing 
Amendment Request for Decommissioning of the Newfield, New Jersey Facility), LBP-08-
08, 13-14 (Docket No. 40-7102-MLA, June 2, 2008) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML081540188. 
 51. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site) CLI-05-17, 62 
N.R.C. 134 (2005). 
 52. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 
64 N.R.C. 460, 474-75 (2006). 
 53. Id. at 475. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 480. 
 56. Id. at 481. 
 57. Id. at 491-93. 
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permits or a combined license application, such an approach would be 
“extremely troubling.”58  It also noted that the Board’s “confidence in the 
Staff’s judgment would have been materially improved had the more 
important of those facts [the Staff’s factual findings] been checked.”59  The 
ASLB noted that the wide variation in the level of detail in different sub-
sections of the final SER implied, at minimum, a lack of co-ordination, and, 
at worst, a lack of supervision.60  Emphasizing its concern with the quality 
of the reporting, the ASLB explicitly stated that it did not conduct further 
inquiries into these issues because it felt bound by a Commission 
instruction to defer to the NRC Staff.61  Without that instruction from the 
Commission, the ASLB would have conducted “a much more probing 
review” into the quality of the review and reporting.62 
As a result of these issues, the ASLB found nearly ninety safety 
matters that required further explanation, sixty that required inquiry beyond 
the first set of questions, and a number that required resolution at an oral 
hearing.63  In the end, the ASLB found that issuance of the Clinton ESP 
would not be inimical to common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public.64  However, the decision makes clear that to make that 
finding the ASLB had to prompt the Staff in many areas to provide logical 
explanations that it could rely upon.  In addition, the ASLB would not have 
been comfortable relying on unverified facts supplied by the applicant, if it 
had not been instructed by the Commission to do so. 
Similarly, in the two other ESP decisions, the Board found many 
issues that needed clarification and follow-up after the NRC Staff’s review 
was complete.  For example, in the North Anna ESP proceeding, the ASLB 
issued a “wave of safety questions” initially and finally concluded that 
seven topics needed to be addressed by oral testimony.65  The Board found 
that after the NRC Staff review, “six fundamental questions” remained for 
which insufficient information was available prior to the ASLB 
 
 58. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 
64 N.R.C. 460, 492-93 (2006). 
 59. Id. at 492. 
 60. Id. at 496. 
 61. Id. at 492. 
 62. Id. at 496. 
 63. Id. at 479. 
 64. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 
64 N.R.C. 460, 497-98 (2006). 
 65. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), 
LBP-07-09, 65 N.R.C. 539, 563 (2007). 
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proceeding.66  Only after taking account of all of the record evidence, 
including that added by the ASLB proceeding, did the Board find the record 
was sufficient to support a “not inimical” finding.”67  Likewise, in the 
Grand Gulf ESP proceeding the ASLB found that in several instances, it 
was necessary for the ASLB to “amplify, modify, or change statements” in 
the SER.”68  The Board, therefore, deferred a number of issues to later 
stages.69  Thus, in all three ESP proceedings completed to date, the Board 
felt it necessary to significantly supplement the record of the NRC Staff’s 
safety review in order to have sufficient information to make the findings 
required by the AEA. 
IV.  RULES REGARDING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN 
SAFETY DECISIONS DURING RELICENSING 
A.  Obtaining Intervenor Status 
To obtain an adjudicatory hearing on an issue concerning relicensing, 
public interest groups must first petition to intervene and have a contention 
admitted.  The rules regarding contentions are provided by 10 C.F.R. § 
2.309.  First, petitioners must state the contention by providing “a specific 
statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.”70  Next 
petitioners must “[p]rovide a brief explanation of the basis for the 
contention,”71 and “a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinions which support the petitioner’s position.”72  This element of the 
rule ensures that “full adjudicatory hearings are triggered only by those able 
to proffer . . . minimal factual and legal foundation in support of their 
contentions.”73 
Petitioners must also demonstrate that the issues raised in their 
contentions are within the scope of the proceeding.74 This hurdle has often 
proved fatal for petitioners precisely because the scope of the safety issues 
 
 66. Id. at 629. 
 67. Id. at 599, 629. 
 68. System Energy Resources (Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), LBP-07-01, 
65 N.R.C. 27, 102 (2007). 
 69. Id. at 102-03. 
 70. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i) (2009). 
 71. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(ii) (2009). 
 72. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (2009). 
 73. In the Matter of Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), 
CLI-99-11, 49 N.R.C. 328, 334 (1999). 
 74. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii) (2009). 
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reviewed during relicensing is so narrow.  In addition, the regulations 
require petitioners to “[d]emonstrate that the issue raised in the contention 
is material to the findings the N.R.C. must make to support the action that is 
involved in the proceeding.”75  A showing of materiality should not be an 
onerous requirement, because all that is needed is a “minimal showing that 
material facts are in dispute, indicating that a further inquiry is 
appropriate.”76 
Finally, the contention must be timely.  This seems deceptively simple 
because the NRC asks for petitions to intervene and so petitions made on or 
before the specified deadline are necessarily timely.  However, the deadline 
for contentions is normally set long before the NRC Staff reaches a 
conclusion on the adequacy of the relicensing application.  Thus, potential 
petitioners do not get the benefit of seeing which areas are the subject of 
further inquiry by the Staff, nor do they know how the aging managements 
programs proposed in the license renewal application will change during 
the Staff review. 
 Although the text of the rules is somewhat unclear, the ASLB, in a 
number of decisions, has recognized that petitioners may add new safety 
contentions after filing their initial petition, if they act in accordance with 
10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) (2009).77  This Section requires a showing that: 
(i) The information upon which the amended or new contention is 
based was not previously available; 
(ii) The information upon which the amended or new contention is 
based is materially different than information previously available; 
and 
(iii) The amended or new contention has been submitted in a timely 
fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information.78 
However, as is discussed below, the ASLB in the Oyster Creek proceeding 
was very reluctant to allow new contentions to be admitted even when they 
were based on what was ostensibly new and materially different 
information. 
 
 75. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv) (2009). 
 76. Georgia Inst. Tech., CLI-95-12, 42 N.R.C. 111, 118 (1995); Rules of Practice for 
Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 
33, 171 (Aug. 11, 1989) (final rule) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 77. See, e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC (Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-32, 62 N.R.C. 813 (2005). 
 78. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii) (2009). 
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B.  The Adjudicatory Procedures for Licensing Cases 
The coup de grace in terms of limiting citizen participation in 
relicensing was delivered in 2004, when the NRC changed the procedural 
rules to try to streamline the administrative adjudication of contentions in 
licensing decisions.79  The new rules did away with the trial-type 
proceeding that had been used and, by default, replaced it with a hybrid 
approach that allowed for mandatory document disclosure, exchange of 
direct testimony, briefing prior to a hearing, and a hearing at which all the 
questioning of witnesses would be by the administrative judges, not by the 
attorneys for each party.80  The new rules only provide for the use of trial-
type procedures for reactor licensing hearings if the presiding officer finds 
that the “contested matter necessitates resolution of issues of material fact 
relating to the occurrence of a past activity, where the credibility of an 
eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue, and/or issues of 
motive or intent of the party or eyewitness [are] material to the resolution of 
the contested matter.”81 
The First Circuit found that these rule changes would meet the 
statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, provided the 
NRC was true to its word and allowed cross-examination when necessary 
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.82  However, the court warned that 
if the NRC was not true to its word and did not allow cross-examination 
when required, “nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules against 
future challenges.”83 
These procedural rules created many challenges for potential 
petitioners.  For example, while applicants have many years to prepare an 
application, intervenors only have sixty days to submit their proposed issues 
for adjudication.84  Furthermore, because experts are an essential part of the 
process, intervenors must quickly find and fund experts on nuclear-related 
matters willing to testify against the nuclear industry.  This is not easy 
given the limited resources available to most potential petitioners. 
 
 79. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 344 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 80. Id. at 345. 
 81. Id. at 344, n.3 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d) (2009)).  
 82. Id. at 351; NRC, Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,195-96 
(Jan. 14, 2004) (final rule). 
 83. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 354 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 84. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Servs. (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), 
Licensing Board Memorandum and Order, LBP-08-11 at 45 (Docket No.70-3098-MLA, Jun. 
27, 2008) (concurring opinion of Judge Farrar) available at ADAMS Accession No. 
ML081790253. 
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Even when a hearing is granted, intervenors face formidable hurdles in 
obtaining a fair hearing.  One judge noted that intervenors had brought 
valuable issues to the Board’s attention, despite these disadvantages and 
wondered how much more the public might contribute to nuclear safety, if 
the NRC’s procedural rules allowed them to.85  For example, raising new 
issues is very difficult and intervenors are forced to dissipate scarce 
resources on duplicative filings to try to overcome very strict timing 
requirements.86  Unless the judges are sympathetic, the proceeding “turn[s] 
into a shell game, with the usual street-corner outcome: whatever guess the 
Petitioners make will prove wrong.”87  Furthermore, in nearly all 
proceedings intervenors must not only litigate against the applicants, they 
must also litigate against the NRC Staff, who may opt to become a party.  
Sometimes the Staff litigates issues even more vigorously than the licensee.  
For example, the NRC Staff recently appealed the decision of the licensing 
board in the Vermont Yankee license renewal proceeding, even though the 
applicant decided not to appeal. 
V.  THE OYSTER CREEK EXPERIENCE 
The net effect of the changes in the substantive and procedural rules 
was to chill citizen participation in relicensing decisions.  In 2006, for only 
the second time in a relicensing proceeding, the coalition of six citizens’ 
groups managed to have a contention admitted.  That contention concerned 
the safety of the steel vessel that comprises the containment system.  In 
2007, the contention then became the subject of the first-ever public hearing 
on a relicensing application.  At that time over 44 of the 104 nuclear plants 
in the United States had renewed their licenses without any hearing, a count 
that has now increased to 55.  Showing the positive aspects of citizen 
participation, after the licensing board admitted the contention, the Oyster 
Creek licensee improved its proposal for the aging management of the 
containment five separate times in an effort to moot out the contention.88 
 
 85. Id. at 49. 
 86. Id. at 45. 
 87. Id. at 54. 
 88. The intervention at Vermont Yankee further illustrates the positive effects of public 
participation where citizens groups highlighted a safety issue involving metal fatigue 
calculations; the NRC staff missed the same mistake at nine other reactors, but later 
acknowledged that the calculations needed to be addressed.  Ultimately, the licensing board 
affirmed that additional metal fatigue calculations needed to be done prior to any licensing 
decision.  Bizarrely, the NRC Staff, but not the applicant, is currently appealing this decision 
to the Commission. 
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The Oyster Creek experience showed that the rules may produce a 
streamlined decision process when they serve to exclude citizens, but they 
produce the opposite effect when a contention is fully litigated.  In practice, 
application of the revised rules generated endless procedural motions in 
response to emerging information and much confusion about the scope of 
the hearing.89  As Judge Farrar recognized, because lawyers and experts 
cost money, the huge imbalance in resources between citizens and plant 
operators hampers citizens’ ability to get a fair hearing.  This became 
obvious at the Oyster Creek hearing when NRC and Exelon presented at 
least sixteen expert witnesses to oppose the one witness the citizens could 
afford.90  In addition, two public interest lawyers for the intervenors were 
opposed by two lawyers for the NRC Staff and four lawyers from a large 
law firm for the applicant.  The resource imbalance is made all the more 
important because the Board did not permit any cross-examination at the 
hearing.  This means there was no opportunity for the intervenors to compel 
the applicant’s experts to make the intervenor’s case or probe for 
weaknesses in the reassuring statements offered by the licensee.  The issue 
of cross-examination serves well to illustrate how the rules can serve as a 
Catch-22.  In practice, the Board found that cross-examination was only 
permitted when intervenors could show that a witness was lying, but it is 
extremely difficult to show that without the ability to depose the witness in 
advance.91 
Furthermore, if citizens try to find out what is going on at their local 
plant without resorting to litigation they face many obstacles in obtaining 
information.  For example, prior to the intervention, some of the intervenors 
tried to obtain measurements of the thickness of the containment shell at 
Oyster Creek taken in 1996.  They found, however, that the NRC did not 
possess the information and the licensee refused to release it.  At one point 
 
 89. See generally Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Oyster Creek License 
Extension Application, http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/oyster.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2009) (listing some of the many pleadings filed in the Oyster Creek relicensing 
process). 
 90. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station), Initial Decision, LBP-07-17, 29 n. 32 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Dec. 
18, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML073520402. 
 91. The legality of the Board’s decision is called into question by a subsequent 
inspection report that shows that many of the witnesses at the hearing gave testimony in 
favor of relicensing that was either incorrect or overly optimistic.  Webster, supra note 38.  
Although the NRC promised the First Circuit that it would allow cross-examination 
whenever required for full and true disclosure of the facts, it is now apparent that the 
procedures at the Oyster Creek hearing were insufficient to generate such disclosure from 
the licensee.  Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 351 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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in the proceeding the licensing board even faulted the intervenors for failing 
to obtain this information prior to filing their contention, when in fact they 
had made diligent efforts to obtain it.92  As discussed above, when this 
information was finally disclosed it showed that these measurements 
showed that the metal thickness in all ten areas measured had increased, 
which is physically impossible.93 
Even during litigation, licensees may try to exclude citizens or limit 
their participation by refusing to release information.  For example, even 
though the NRC has recognized that there may be a problem with the metal 
fatigue calculations at Oyster Creek, Exelon has refused to release these 
calculations.94  The NRC Staff managed to review these calculations, but 
shielded them from release through the Freedom of Information Act by 
carrying out their work in the licensee’s office.95 
In addition, because the information obtained is highly technical, 
citizens need experts to interpret it.  In the wake of the 1979, accident at 
Three Mile Island, all of the major accident reviews recommended that 
funding be made available to responsible citizens’ groups so that they could 
act as a deterrent to regulatory agency complacency.  Congress has so far 
failed to do this, but it is long overdue. 
During the Oyster Creek proceeding, the citizens attempted to file a 
number of contentions based upon new information, but this proved a 
frustrating process.  For example, during the Oyster Creek proceeding, the 
NRC Staff commissioned Sandia National Laboratories (“Sandia”) to 
review the modeling providing the basis for the acceptance criteria for the 
thickness of the containment vessel at Oyster Creek.96  Although Sandia 
used favorable assumptions about the thickness of the vessel, Sandia found 
that a key enhancement used by the licensee to increase the apparent 
strength of the vessel was not justified in certain circumstances and that the 
vessel barely met the safety requirements.97  However, when citizens 
 
 92. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station), Memorandum and Order (Granting Permission to File a New 
Contention), LBP-06-22 at 31-32 (Docket No. 50-021-LR, Oct. 10, 2006) available at 
ADAMS Accession No. ML062830381. 
 93. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Safety Evaluation Report, supra note 42. 
 94. E-mail from Polonsky to Webster, (Apr. 11, 2008) (on file with author). 
 95. N.R.C. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request 2008-0283, (Aug. 13, 
2008). 
 96. Jason P. Petti, Sandia National Laboratories, Structural Integrity Analysis of the 
Degraded Drywell Containment at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 
SAND2007-0055 at 11 (Jan. 12, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML070120395. 
 97. Id. at 77-82. 
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sought to admit a new contention based upon the new work by Sandia, the 
Board found that the information was not new, because Sandia had merely 
reviewed old data and the intervenors could have commissioned their own 
similar study.98  This is akin to telling the finders of the Rosetta Stone that 
it was not important and it contained no new information, because those 
who were trying to translate hieroglyphics could have done so without it, 
had they been sufficiently skilled.  Clearly, had citizens known about 
Sandia’s study at the time the initial contentions were due, they could have 
easily alleged that the acceptance criteria which were based on the 
enhancement were incorrect.  Because this information did not come out 
until over a year after the time for initial contentions were due, citizens 
were denied the opportunity to fully litigate this issue. 
In the initial decision on Oyster Creek the Board found that there was 
reasonable assurance that the containment system met and would continue 
to meet the CLB.  Judge Barrata, however, in an additional statement, 
warned that additional analysis was needed prior to the commencement of 
the extended period of operation and set out some requirements for the 
analysis.  Specifically, he stated that he believed that the licensee failed to 
“fully” show that “there is reasonable assurance that the factor of safety 
required by the regulations will be met throughout the period of extended 
operation.”99  This is because “to date . . . no analysis of the actual 
condition of the drywell has been done.”100  Therefore, “[t]o date we do not 
know what the actual safety factor is.”101  Adding to the uncertainty caused 
by this lack of analysis is “a very limited knowledge of the actual thickness 
of the shell” because “there are large areas of the drywell in the sand bed 
region that do not have recent measurements or any measurements at 
all.”102  Therefore, “it [is] essential to have a conservative best estimate 
analysis of the drywell shell before entering the period of extended 
 
 98. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station), Memorandum and Order (Denying Citizens’ Motion for Leave to Add a 
New Contention), 8-12 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Apr. 10, 2007) available at ADAMS 
Accession No. ML071000374. 
 99. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Initial Decision, supra note 90, Additional 
Statement of Judge Baratta at 1 (Although Judge Baratta did not style his “statement” as a 
dissent, he states that he differs with his colleagues on whether the licensee has shown 
reasonable assurance that the factor of safety, a CLB requirement, will be met.  Because such 
reasonable assurance is required before a license renewal can proceed, Judge Baratta’s 
statement is effectively a dissent.). 
 100. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 5. 
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operation.”103  In addition, that analysis must take account of the 
uncertainty.104  Therefore, the applicant should be required to perform a 
series of sensitivity analyses.105  On appeal, the Commission found that it 
was unclear whether a proposed license condition would meet Judge 
Baratta’s requirements.  The Commission, therefore, remanded this 
question back to the licensing board.  On remand, the Board held another 
hearing on this issue in September 2008 and subsequently recommended 
imposing additional conditions on the analysis, including more robust 
sensitivity analysis and further work by Sandia on the issue of the 
enhancement discussed above, which citizens were able to raise belatedly 
on remand.106  The Commission has somewhat vaguely endorsed these 
recommendations in its decision to relicense Oyster Creek.107 
Furthermore, it appears that the problems observed at Oyster Creek 
may reflect systemic problems with the relicensing process.  In an audit of a 
number of relicensing reviews, including that for Oyster Creek, the NRC 
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) highlighted that NRC’s relicensing 
safety reviews suffered from a lack of quality control and were inconsistent 
in terms of thoroughness.108  In addition, the safety review of the Oconee 
plant stated that Staff had verified adequate performance of the coating 
system, when in fact problems with coating failures were well known to the 
NRC.109  In a follow up memorandum, the OIG found that because the Staff 
had destroyed their working papers after each review was complete, it is 
very difficult to verify in detail how well the safety reviews were carried 
out.110 
The Oyster Creek intervenors together with Riverkeeper and a number 
of other intervenors in other proceedings have also shown that the NRC’s 
relicensing safety reviews rely excessively upon unchecked licensee 
 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. at 5. 
 105. Id. at 6. 
 106. Memorandum (Addressing The Issue Referred By The Commission Regarding The 
Adequacy Of AmerGen’s Proposed 3-D Finite Element Structural Analysis Studies), In the 
Matter Of AmerGen Energy Co, LLC (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station), 16-17 (Oct. 29, 2008). 
 107. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), 
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summary documents, and that the NRC Staff prematurely destroyed the 
working documents showing in detail how the safety review at Oyster 
Creek was conducted.111  Although the Commission did not grant any relief 
to remedy these problems, Commissioner Jackzo indicated in his dissent 
that additional examination of the adequacy of the safety review should 
have been carried out.112 
In summary, through participation in the Oyster Creek proceeding and 
review of public NRC documents, citizens were able gather over 50,000 
pages of documents that were not previously in the public domain and 
show: 
1.  the current licensing basis (“CLB”) is unclear and NRC Staff 
have repeatedly attempted to manipulate the CLB to favor the 
applicant; 
2.  “reasonable assurance” is a catch phrase that is not clear enough 
for enforcement purposes; 
3.  the acceptance criteria applied to the thickness measurements at 
Oyster Creek were inadequate to maintain the CLB; 
4.  measurements that Exelon and the previous owner had relied 
upon to show safety for ten years were systematically biased in 
favor of greater metal thickness; 
5.  the modeling work upon which the applicant was relying was 
outdated, used a questionable enhancement, and did not take full 
account of the uncertainties; 
6.  Exelon violated a commitment to monitor an important drain for 
eight years before anyone noticed because its commitment 
tracking was inadequate; 
7.  NRC Staff have a policy of reviewing important documents 
away from NRC offices and then shielding the reviewed 
documents from FOIA requests; 
 
 111. Supplemental Petitions by Listed Petitioners for Additional Investigation and 
Correction of Deficiencies Regarding License Renewal Reviews, for Oyster Creek, Indian 
Point, Pilgrim, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants, 3-6 ((Dockets Nos. 50-219-LR 
(Oyster Creek), 50-247-LR & 50-286-LR (Indian Point), 50-293-LR (Pilgrim), and 50-271-
LR (Vermont Yankee), May 15, 2008)) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML081640245 
(parties filed identical supplemental petitions). 
 112. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co., et al., Commission Memorandum and Order 
Responding to the Petition and Supplemental Petition Filed By Intervenor Groups (Dockets 
Nos. 50-219-LR (Oyster Creek), 50-247LR & 50-286-LR (Indian Point), 50-293-LR 
(Pilgrim), and 50-271-LR (Vermont Yankee), 34-5 (CLI-08-23, Oct. 6, 2008)) (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Jaczko) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML082800440. 
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8.  NRC Staff do not retain their working documents showing what 
they actually do during safety reviews.  It is therefore impossible 
for the Commission to check the work of the staff; 
9.  The NRC Staff’s attitude is that unless there is an obvious 
problem, they should not do any in-depth review – safety-culture 
is lacking.  Often, the staff does not check the facts given to it by 
the licensee; and 
10.  Public participation leads to better decision-making. 
The Oyster Creek experience has confirmed that the problems at the 
NRC are deep rooted and has further undermined public confidence in the 
agency.  The Oyster Creek proceeding has accomplished what the 
Commission and the industry may have hoped changes to the relicensing 
and procedural rules would avoid; it has provided a window into NRC’s 
ongoing safety processes and found them wanting. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATION FOR NRC 
REFORM 
The deficiencies highlighted above show that the nuclear industry in 
the United States is like the financial industry was prior to the crisis of 
2008; there are many risks that are not being properly managed or 
regulated.  Just like the financial industry, the nuclear industry could be 
destroyed if any of these risks actualize into another major incident like that 
at Three Mile Island in 1979.  Therefore, citizens and the nuclear industry 
should now come together to create good processes for maintaining the 
safety of operating nuclear plants.  
With regard to ongoing safety, these processes should include: 
i. Published, clear plant-specific safety standards upon which 
citizens, the NRC, and investors can rely (i.e. codification of the 
Current Licensing Basis (“CLB”) and licensee commitments); 
ii. Requirements that CLB safety standards be met with a specified 
high degree of statistical certainty; 
iii. A centralized publicly accessible database of exemptions, 
corrective actions, violations of CLB safety standards, and 
violations of licensee commitments; 
iv. Prompt notice to interested parties when the safety requirements in 
the CLB or licensee commitments are changed or not met; 
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v. Citizen access to all non-proprietary non-safeguards licensee 
documents containing information relevant to nuclear safety and 
access to redacted versions of proprietary or safeguards 
documents; 
vi. A publicly available log of all NRC documents withheld from 
public release and a simple process to challenge Staff decisions to 
withhold documents; 
vii. Technical assistance grants to local citizens groups to enable them 
to hire expert assistance; and 
viii. A citizen suit provision (with fees when citizens prevail) so that 
disputes about ongoing safety that the NRC Staff declines to 
address can be resolved in the District Court under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and citizen groups would not be forced to 
bear the costs of stepping in to make up for the failure of the NRC. 
Recommended improvements specific to the relicensing process include: 
i. Expand the scope beyond the aging management of long-lived passive 
components to include: 
a.  A comprehensive review of whether safety standards in the CLB 
should be improved based on a presumption that relicensed plants 
should meet the same standards as new plants, unless the applicant 
can show that that the cost of achieving the higher safety standard 
would be disproportionate to the benefits; 
b. A de novo review of current compliance with all CLB safety 
standards and licensee commitments; and 
c.  Plant-specific resolution of generic safety issues. 
ii. Change the Part 2 adjudication rules to more closely mirror the federal 
rules of civil procedure, including: 
a. Notice pleading with a liberal standard for adding or amending 
issues for adjudication as more information comes to light; 
b. Flexibility on timing; 
c. Construe disputed facts in favor of petitioners; 
d. Full discovery of the licensee’s knowledge, including depositions; 
e. The right to live cross-examination; and 
f. Preventing NRC itself from participating as a party. 
iii. Provide a mandatory hearing on safety issues where there is no 
intervenor. 
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 In the absence of these improvements, the NRC will struggle to escape 
capture by the nuclear industry and, even if it is temporarily invigorated by 
the addition of new Commissioners that regard citizen participation more 
favorably and emphasize safety over production, it will tend to revert to 
ineffectiveness like the Atomic Energy Commission before it. 
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